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Casenote

Thy Fiance Doth Protest Too Much: ThirdParty Retaliation Under Title VII After
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP

I.

INTRODUCTION

"To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an
ancient method of revenge . . . ."' In Thompson v. North American

Stainless, LP,2 the United States Supreme Court reversed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by holding that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) confers standing to sue upon
an individual who suffers unlawful retaliation, even though that
individual did not engage in any statutorily-protected conduct.' Prior
to Thompson, lower courts disagreed about whether third-party
retaliation victims had proper standing to file suit under Title VII. In
1. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
2. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
4. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
5. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting that proper standing to vindicate a claim under § 704 requires that the plaintiff
actually engaged in some protected conduct), with Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200
F.3d 73, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that standing to sue under Title VII extends to the
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Thompson, the Supreme Court acknowledged the expansive standard
applied in various lower courts that explicitly permitted third-party
retaliation claims under Title VII,' but ultimately rejected the extreme
positions advocated by the parties in favor of a more moderate analytical
framework.' The Court applied the zone of interests tests to identify
the class of individuals who have proper standing to pursue Title VII
third-party retaliation claims.' Given the recent increase in retaliation
claims,o Thompson potentially exposes employers to more retaliation
liability than ever before. However, significant litigation is still
necessary to determine which combinations of adverse employment
actions and third-party relationships Title VII protects.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1997, North American Stainless, LP (NAS) hired Eric Thompson.n
Three years later, Thompson initiated a romantic relationship with a coworker, Miriam Regalado. By early 2003, Thompson and Regalado were
engaged to be married, and NAS management was aware of their
engagement. On February 13, 2003, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) informed NAS that Regalado
filed a charge alleging unlawful sex discrimination and, on March 7,
2003, NAS terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson subsequently filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging NAS unlawfully retaliated
against him because of Regalado's statutorily-protected conduct. 2

limits established by Article III of the United States Constitution).
6. See, e.g., Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 1971)
(concluding that mere Article III standing is sufficient to bring suit under Title VII).
7. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868-70.
8. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970)
(holding that, assuming a potential litigant satisfies the Constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability, to maintain proper prudential
standing, the party's interests must arguably be within the zone of interests Congress
intended the applicable statute to protect).
9. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
10.

Press Release, EEOC Reports Job Bias ChargesHit Record High of Nearly 100,000

in Fiscal Year 2010, EEOC.Gov (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeocnewsroom/rele
ase/1-11-11.cfm. For the first time since Congress enacted Title VII, retaliation claims
surpassed race discrimination claims as the charge most commonly filed with the EEOC.
Id. In fiscal year 2010, individuals filed 36,258 retaliation claims, compared to 35,890 race
discrimination claims. Id.
11. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S.
Ct. 863 (2011).
12. Id.
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After completing an investigation, the EEOC found "reasonable cause
to believe that [NAS] violated Title VII."" Thompson filed suit against
NAS, alleging the company violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII' by terminating his employment in retaliation for his fianc6's
EEOC charge." The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of NAS
because Thompson did not personally engage in any statutorily-protected
conduct.' 6 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees who are closely associated with an individual engaged in
protected conduct, even when the employee who was the target of the
retaliation did not. 7
The court of appeals granted a rehearing en banc and affirmed the
district court's decision, holding that Thompson did not have proper
standing to pursue a Title VII retaliation claim because he did not
personally engage in any protected conduct." The en banc majority
relied upon precedent from other circuits that refused to recognize
§ 704" retaliation claims where the individual plaintiff did not
personally engage in any protected conduct.2 0 To resolve the split
amongst the circuits,2 1 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Subsequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals decision, holding

13.

Id.

14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
15. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806.
16. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 636-40 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
17. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644,646 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd en banc,
567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
18. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
20. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809-11 (citing Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561
(3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM
Indus., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996)).
21. In addition to those circuits that refused to recognize retaliation claims where the
victim did not engage in any protected conduct, see sources cited, supra note 20, several
other circuits have articulated standards that protect third parties from retaliation, even
if those parties did not engage in any protected conduct. See, e.g., Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d
1543, 1545-50 (11th Cir. 1989) (permitting a husband's retaliation claim to proceed where
he alleged retaliation because his wife filed discrimination charges against their mutual
employer); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 258, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a cause of action for retaliation exists when the defendant reassigned the plaintiff as
punishment for failing to prevent his subordinate from filing a sexual harassment
complaint).
22. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
3542 (U.S. June 29, 2010) (No. 09-291).
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that Title VII confers standing upon "person[sl aggrieved"2 3-those
whose interests are "arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes"-and that Thompson was such a person.24 The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Thompson
suffered unlawful retaliation under § 704.25
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Elements of a Title VII § 704 Retaliation Claim
Congress enacted Title V11 26 to eliminate employment discrimination
on the basis of certain immutable characteristics." Section 703(a)
prohibits covered employers from discriminating against employees or
potential employees on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion,
or sex.28 Further, § 704 prohibits employers from retaliating against
individuals who oppose any unlawful employment practice or participate
in an investigation into allegedly unlawful employment practices under
Title VII. 29 Specifically, Congress enacted § 704 to protect individuals
who exercise their rights under § 703 by prohibiting retaliation that
would dissuade similarly-situated, reasonable employees from engaging
in statutorily-protected conduct.30 To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under § 704, the plaintiff must (1) have engaged in some type

A.

23. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f) (2006).
24. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l Credit Union
Admin. v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust, 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)).
25. Id. at 871.
26. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
27. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
28. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a). The statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
29. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a). The statute provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
30. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 77 (2006) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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of protected conduct, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
demonstrate a causal link between the statutorily-protected conduct and
the adverse employment action."
Title VII protects two distinct varieties of employee conduct: "oppos[ition]," where an employee reasonably opposes a plausibly unlawful
employment practice; and "participatlion]," where an employee files an
administrative charge, levels an official internal complaint, or otherwise
participates in any investigation or proceeding under Title VII. 2 Thus,
an employer may not take an adverse employment action against an
employee because he opposed an employment practice prohibited under
Title VII. 3 But, the method of opposition must be reasonable" and
based on an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer's
conduct violated Title VII." However, § 704 "participation" protection
is broader, prohibiting employers from retaliating against an individual
for any participation in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing
Because the participation clause safeguards
governed by Title VII.
set up by Title VII,"' it shields a broader
"machinery
the essential
Consequently, the
range of conduct than the opposition clause."
breadth of participation clause protection encompasses many situations
that do not immediately appear to warrant protection.39
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,4o the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split when it defined an "adverse
employment action" as any materially adverse action, including those not
affecting the terms and conditions of employment, that "might have
31. See Brown v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010).
32. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a).
33. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 273-74
(2009) (extending § 704 protection to employees who oppose another employee's sexual
harassment during the employer's investigation of the other employee's complaint).
34. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259-60 (4th Cir. 1998).
35. Butler v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2008) (requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate both a subjective belief that an employer's conduct violated Title
VII, and that that belief was objectively reasonable, given the totality of the circumstances).
36. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a).
37. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Silver v. K.C.A.,
Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978)).
38. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that even individuals who file malicious and defamatory EEOC charges are
protected from retaliation by the participation clause).
39. See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457-58 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting that, provided the plaintiff has a reasonable belief that the opposed conduct violates
Title VII, filing a claim with the EEOC about an ultimately permissible employment
practice is classified as protected participation under § 704).
40. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
Textual distinctions between § 703 and § 704
discrimination."'
motivated the Court to conclude that unlawful employment practices
under § 704 are "not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the
terms and conditions of employment." 2 Also, the Court established an
objective standard under which a plaintiff must prove that the adverse
employment action would have deterred a similarly-situated, reasonable
employee from engaging in protected conduct.4 ' Requiring this distinction between significant and trivial workplace harms echoed the
Court's jurisprudence concerning § 703 discrimination, which rejects
claims alleging garden-variety workplace insults.

41. Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Prior
to Burlington Northern, ten circuit courts of appeal had considered this issue and
articulated three different standards. Under the restrictive standard, employers were only
prohibited from utilizing an "ultimate employment decision" to retaliate against an
individual. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (limiting actionable retaliation
to circumstances involving "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating"); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). Under
the intermediate standard, employers were prohibited from taking "materially adverse
action" that negatively impacted an individual's "terms, conditions, or benefits of
employment." See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239,242 (4th Cir.
1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under the expansive approach, which the Supreme Court
adopted in BurlingtonNorthern,employers were prohibited from taking materially adverse
employment actions that could be reasonably expected to dissuade similarly-situated
employees from exercising statutorily-protected rights. See, e.g., Washington v. Ill. Dep't
of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that refusing to grant flexible
scheduling could constitute actionable retaliation because that flexibility was specifically
implemented to accommodate an employee's duty as primary caretaker for her disabled
son); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ray v. Henderson, 217
F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000).
42. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-64 (explaining that § 703 prohibits unlawful
discrimination "with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" as well as unlawful employment practices that "deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee," while § 704 prohibits unlawful retaliation, without explicitly prohibiting any
particular employer conduct).
43. Id. at 69.
44. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (noting that judicial
standards under Title VII must "filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations
of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and
occasional teasing") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Causation, accurately described as "the linchpin of a retaliation
claim,"' is often the most vigorously contested issue in Title VII
retaliation cases." Because most modern employers are savvy enough
not to blatantly reveal discriminatory motivations,4 7 plaintiffs must
often prove causation via circumstantial evidence." While many forms
of circumstantial evidence exist, retaliation plaintiffs often rely on the
temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse
employment action." As a result, courts and commentators have
identified temporal proximity as extremely powerful circumstantial
evidence in § 704 retaliation claims.o
The Supreme Court has not yet established a bright-line rule
addressing when temporal proximity alone is sufficient to satisfy § 704
causation requirements." In Clark County School District v. Breeden,52 while acknowledging the general consensus that temporal
proximity is strong evidence of causation, the Court held that to
establish causation on temporal proximity alone, an individual's
protected conduct and adverse employment action must be "very
close."" Since Breeden, lower courts have clarified when temporal
proximity alone satisfies causation, illustrating that a period of days or
weeks is sufficient, but a period of months or years is not." Neverthe-

45. Justin P. O'Brien, Note, Weighing Temporal Proximity in Title VII Retaliation
Claims, 43 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2002).
46. See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful
RetaliationUnder the Title VII Following Mattern: Will CourtsKnow It When They See It?,

14 LAB. LAW. 373, 380 & n.37 (1998) (noting that the absence of a bright-line rule often
makes establishing causation "the most hotly contested element of a retaliation lawsuit").
47. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)

(noting that "employers who discriminate are not likely to announce their discriminatory
motive").
48. Ann Clarke Snell & Lisa R. Eskow, What Motivates the Ultimate Decisioamaker?
An Analysis of Legal Standards for Proving Causation and Malice in Employment
RetaliationSuits, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 381, 396 (1998).
49. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts,63

Mo. L. REV. 115, 143 (1998).
50. See Debbie Rodman Sandler & Laura W. Brewer, Retaliation Claims Under the
Civil Rights Acts: Treacherous Waters for Employers, 13 LAB. LAW. 107, 119 (1997)

(identifying temporal proximity as the critical element in most circumstantial retaliation
case).
51. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,273-74 (2001).
52. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
53. Id. at 273 (quoting O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir.
2001)).
54.

Compare, e.g., Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2003)

(nine days sufficient), and El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 932 (2d Cir. 2010)
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less, courts still permit retaliation claims in the absence of close
temporal proximity, provided parties demonstrate causation with other
sufficient evidence.55
B.

Standing to Pursue Title VII Claims in Federal Court
Plaintiffs in federal court must satisfy three Constitutional standing
requirements to avoid dismissal, each of which flow directly from Article
III of the United States Constitution: 6 injury, causation, and redressability." Additionally, plaintiffs must often satisfy several non-constitutional, prudential standing requirements." These prudential standing
requirements include the prohibition against third-party standing," the
prohibition against generalized grievances," and the zone of interests
test." However, legislation may relax or totally negate these prudential standing requirements; for example, Congress may authorize the
enforcement of federal law by private citizens who would otherwise
possess no legal right to do so." Congress achieves this objective by

(less than four weeks "arguably" sufficient), with Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d
1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (three months insufficient), Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d
1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four months insufficient), and Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack,
657 F.3d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2011) (six years insufficient).
55. See, e.g., Burnell v. Gates Rubber Co., 647 F.3d 704, 709-10 (7th Cir. 2011)
(acknowledging causation existed where a supervisor accused the plaintiff of "playing the
race card"); Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on supervisor's
alleged statements demonstrating retaliatory animus to establish causation).
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
57. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring plaintiffs to
plead that they have suffered, are suffering, or will imminently suffer: (1) an injury in fact
(2) caused by the defendant that (3) is "likely" to be redressed by an award of the requested
relief).
58. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (noting that proper standing implicates
both Article III restrictions on federal court jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's
prudential limitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction). Courts articulate both the
Constitutional and prudential standing requirements, maintaining that only the former are
constitutionally compelled.
59. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 362 (3d ed. 2009) ("[Tihe Court typically
insists that litigants are equally barred from advancing legal rights that belong to a third
party-that is, someone who is not a formal 'party' to the dispute at hand.").
60. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (noting that standing is not permitted
where "the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens").
61. YACKLE, supra note 59, at 370 (noting that a plaintiff must show the injuries he has
suffered, or will imminently suffer, implicate an interest that is "arguably within the zone
of interests" protected by the statute he seeks to enforce) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
62. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-66 (holding that the "citizen-suit" provision of the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), relaxes the
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conferring standing upon specific classes of potential litigants via
legislation." To effectuate various statutory schemes, Congress confers
standing to sue as it deems most appropriate to the extent permitted
under the Constitution.6 4 Therefore, Congress's Article 165 power
challenges the judiciary to interpret exactly how far statutory language
expands standing and, thus, what classes of persons are entitled to bring
suit under these various statutes.6 6
Title VII provides that "a civil action may be brought . .. by the

Prior to Thompson v. North
person claiming to be aggrieved."
American Stainless, LP," the Supreme Court had not interpreted how
broadly this language conferred standing to sue upon individual
However, in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc.," the United
citizens.
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted this language
to include any individual who satisfied minimal Article III standing.
In Hackett, the plaintiff, Ozzie Hackett, was a former employee alleging
race discrimination in discharge and pension benefits.72 Because
Hackett was already retired when he filed suit, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to classify him as an "employ-

prudential standing requirement by authorizing that "any person may commence a civil
suit"). Such broad language entitles any individual person seeking to enforce the Endangered Species Act to file suit, provided that person satisfy minimal Article III standing.
See id. at 162-64.
63. Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private Attorneys General, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 244 (1999).

64. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (2006) (authorizing a person "injured in his business or
property" to seek enforcement of fair trade statutes via litigation in federal court); 15
U.S.C. § 298(b) (2006) (authorizing "competitors, customers, or subsequent purchasers" to
enforce gold and silver standards via litigation). While Congress may confer standing to
sue as it deems fit, Constitutional standing requirements are unassailable. Ass'n of Data
Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
65. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
66. Compare,e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII enforcement provision permitting
private enforcement by a "person aggrieved"), with 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) (Americans
with Disabilities Act enforcement provision permitting private enforcement by "any person
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [the statute]"). Congress's
decision to incorporate different statutory language implies different classes of private
individuals are entitled to enforce statutory rights via litigation.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
68. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
69. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 & n.8 (1972).
70. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
71. Id. at 446 (articulating that "the language'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows
a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution").
72.

Id. at 445-46.
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ee" pursuant to § 701(f);73 thus denying him standing to sue under Title
VII." The Third Circuit reversed, noting that the district court was
incorrect to apply § 701(f)7 and should have applied § 706(f)(1)"
instead." The court interpreted § 706(f)(1) to extend standing to the
limit permissible under Article III." The court also noted that this
interpretation was consistent with congressional intent to confer
standing to sue under Title VII as expansively as permitted under
Article III.7 Furthermore, the decision in Hackett facilitated statutory
policy objectives by preventing procedural technicalities from impeding
the substantive work of Title VII.so Subsequently, the majority of
circuit courts that analyzed this issue adopted the broad Hackett
interpretation of § 706(fX1)."'
While the Supreme Court had never addressed the scope of § 706(f)( 1),
the Court relied on Hackett in a case arising under Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, more commonly known as the Fair Housing Act
(FHA). 2 In Rafficante U. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," two
tenants filed a complaint alleging race discrimination in their apartment
complex's tenant selection process." The plaintiffs in Trafficante relied

73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by
an employer.").
74. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). While this statute defines who is an "employee," the language
does not address who has standing to file suit under Title VII. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (conferring standing to sue upon any individual who is a
"person aggrieved" by some conduct prohibited under Title VII).
77. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445-46 (reasoning that the district court's application of
§ 701(f was inappropriate because that definitional statute "does not speak to the issue
of standing to invoke the remedies of [Title VII]").
78. See id. at 446-47 (concluding that "[ilf the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that
he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in the Article III
sense, then he should have standing to sue").
79. Id. at 446.
80. Id. at 446-47 (opining that "Itihe national public policy reflected ... in Title VII. . .
may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing
or election of remedies").
81. Compare, e.g., Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that § 706(f)(1) standing extends to the limits of Article III), Anjelino v. New
York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 91 & n.25 (3d Cir. 2000), Childress v. City of Richmond, 120
F.3d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1997), EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1980),
EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452-54 (6th Cir. 1977), Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642,
691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976),
with Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining
to acknowledge that Title VII standing is as broad as Article III).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
83. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. Id. at 206-07.
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upon the language of the FHA enforcement provision, which confers
standing to sue upon "[any person who claims to have been injured.""
The Court interpreted this language to confer standing upon "all in the
same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the
management of those facilities."
Most importantly, in Trafficante, the
Court quoted approvingly from Hackett, which interpreted "a person
claiming to be aggrieved" under § 706(f)(1) to "define standing as broadly
as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution."" However, the
Court's holding in rafficante included qualifying language that only
acknowledged proper standing for certain individuals affected by the
defendant's conduct. 8 Nevertheless, dictum in rafficante illustrated
that the Court interpreted "person aggrieved" under § 706(f)(1) to
include any person possessing minimal Article III standing."
C.

PrudentialStanding and the Zone of Interests Test
Acknowledging the proliferation of statutes and variations in statutory
language that confer standing upon potential litigants, the Supreme
Court developed a framework to identify classes of individuals who have
proper standing to sue." In Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp," the Court articulated the zone of interests test,
which provided plaintiffs a less stringent mechanism to satisfy
prudential standing requirements. In Data Processing, the plaintiffs
challenged a Comptroller of the Currency administrative ruling that
allowed banks to offer data processing services, alleging that such an
action negatively impacted their economic interests." Prior to Data
Processing, the Court interpreted Section 702 of the Administrative

85.

Id. at 207 n.1; Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII,

§ 810(a)

(codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)) (section 810(a) articulates that "lany person who claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably
injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter 'person

aggrieved') may file a complaint").
86. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
87.

Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446).

88. Id. (stating that "person aggrieved" under Title VIII is synonymous with Article III
standing, "insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination
are concerned").
89. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869; see Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (dictum).
90. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154-55.

91.

397 U.S. 150 (1970).

92. Id. at 153; see YACKLE, supra note 59, at 329-31.
93. Data Processing,397 U.S. at 151-52 (challenging an action by the Comptroller of
the Currency allowing that "a national bank may make available its data processing
equipment or perform data processing services on such equipment for other banks and
bank customers").
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Procedure Act (APA)P to afford judicial review of agency action only to
individuals who had suffered a "legal wrong"; that is, suffered an
However, Data Processing
invasion of a personal, legal right."
test,
permitting suit by any
articulated a more lenient, harm-based
individual whose interests suffered injury, regardless of whether the
injury involved that individual's personal, legal right, provided the
interest was arguably within the zone of interests Congress intended the
statute to protect." The Court justified its relaxed test by distinguishing between proper standing and the merits of a case." Making this
distinction, the Court stated that while the rights-based test addressed
the merits of a case, "standing is different. It concerns, apart from the
[constitutional] case or controversy test, the [prudential] question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.""
Initially, the Court applied the zone of interests test only to cases
arising under § 702 of the APA; however, since Data Processing,courts
have applied the zone of interests test to grant standing to injured
persons without express legal rights to sue under a variety of statutory
This deferential standard denied standing only to
provisions."
plaintiffs whose claims were not reasonably included in those Congress
intended to permit.oo Nevertheless, the zone of interests test does
occasionally bar suit by plaintiffs whose interests are not even arguably
related to those interests Congress intended the statute to protect.'
94. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
95. See Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (punctuation omitted)
(stating that "if the act complained of does not violate any of [the plaintiffs] legal rights,
it is obvious, that he has no cause to complain. Want of right and want of remedy are
justly said to be reciprocal").
96.
97.

Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
Id.

98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164 (applying the zone of interests test to the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)); Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1991) (applying the zone of interests test to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
100. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (holding that "the test
denies a right of review if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit").
101. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517, 530 (1991). When the United States Postal Service voluntarily surrendered its
monopoly over "extremely urgent" mail delivery on certain domestic routes, the postal
workers' union filed suit claiming the decision harmed the interests of postal workers. Id.
at 519-20. The Supreme Court rejected this position noting relevant statutory language
that indicated "congressional concern was not with opportunities for postal workers but
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The test distinguished between potential litigants by focusing exclusively on the "link" between the plaintiff's interest and the interests
Congress intended the statute to serve.10 2

IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,'0 a the United States
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, holding that some plaintiffs had
standing to sue under § 704,104 even though they did not personally
engage in any statutorily-protected conduct.o Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, identified two distinct issues. First, under Title
VII,' 6 was Thompson's termination unlawful retaliation?'
Second,
if North American Stainless, LP (NAS) unlawfully retaliated against
Thompson, did Title VII grant him standing to sue?"'

A.

Was Thompson's Termination Unlawful Retaliation under § 704?

Justice Scalia first recounted the critical distinction between how
courts interpret the substantive0 '" and anti-retaliation"'0 provisions
of Title VII."' Justice Scalia noted that courts must interpret § 704
more broadly than § 703112 to include a range of employer conduct that
does not directly impact an individual's terms and conditions of employment.' 1 3 Applying these principles, and assuming the facts as Thompson alleged them to be true, the Court had "little difficulty concluding
... NAS's firing of Thompson violated Title VII.""'
Even NAS
acknowledged that Thompson's termination satisfied the expansive

with the receipt of necessary revenues for the Postal Service." Id. at 525-26.
102. See, e.g., Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
492-94 n.7 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the "unmistakable link
between § 109's express restriction on credit union membership and the limitation on the
markets that federal credit unions can serve" creates some objective indication that the
respondent's interest was "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by § 109").
103. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
105. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
107. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
110. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
111. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867-68.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
113. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867-68 (relying on Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006)).
114. Id. at 867.
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Burlington Northern standard."'s However, NAS argued that permitting third-party retaliation would create unreasonable difficulty for
employers, exposing them to litigation for imposing an adverse
employment action against an employee who had any connection with
another employee who had engaged in statutorily-protected conduct."'
While acknowledging the force of that argument, the Court determined
that such a difficulty did not justify categorically excluding third-party
retaliation from Title VII protection."' Relying on Burlington Northem, the Court found no textual or practical justification to craft a
Furthermore,
wholesale exception for third-party retaliation.1 8
considering the variety of third-party retaliation methods and potential
targets available to employers, the Court declined to "identify a fixed
class of relationships" protected by Title VII." The Court noted that
while "firing a close family member will almost always" satisfy the
standard articulated in BurlingtonNorthern,"inflicting a milder reprisal
on a mere acquaintance will almost never" be sufficient. 2 0 Because
"the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon
the particular circumstances,"' 21 and given the many ways third-party
retaliation might occur, the Court concluded that § 704 is "simply not
reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules."'
B. Does Title VII Grant Thompson Standing to Pursue a Claim
Under § 704?
Because NAS, assuming Thompson's allegations to be true, committed
unlawful retaliation, Justice Scalia turned to "[tihe more difficult
question in th [e] case"l 2 a-whether Title VII granted Thompson standing to sue. 2 4 Under Title VII, "a civil action may be brought ... by

115. Id. at 868; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006).
116. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (recognizing this potential difficulty, Justice Scalia
opined rhetorically, "perhaps retaliating against an employee by firing his fianc6e would
dissuade the employee from engaging in protected activity, but what about firing an
employee's girlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-worker?").
117. Id.
118. Id. (noting that "there is no textual basis for making an exception to [the broad
Burlington Northern interpretation of § 7041 for third-party reprisals, and a preference for
clear rules cannot justify departing from statutory text").
119. Id.
120. Id.
121.

Id. (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69).

122. Id.
123. Id. at 869.
124. Id.
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the person claiming to be aggrieved."1 25 Thompson urged the Court to
interpret § 706(f)( 1)126 broadly, conferring standing upon any individual satisfying mere Article 111127 standing, thereby eliminating any
additional prudential standing requirements.'"2 Thompson relied on
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." and its supporting
citation to Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc.,0 because these cases
interpreted § 706(f)(1) to extend Title VII standing to the limits
permitted under Article III."' Furthermore, Thompson supported his
argument by drawing the Court's attention to similarities in statutory
languagel3 and enforcement mechanisms"' between Title VII and
Title VIII.' 34 Thompson argued that the Trafficante opinion bound the
Court to the extremely broad interpretation of §706(f)( 1).3s
However, the Court qualified the holding in Trafficante for two
reasons. 36 First, Justice Scalia pointed out that, despite its broad
125. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(1).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(1) (2006).
127. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
128. Brief for Petitioner, Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 863 (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186 at
*35-36. Thompson cited court of appeals precedent, arguing that "by using the phrase
'person . . . aggrieved' in section 706(f)(1) Congress authorized suit by any plaintiff with
Article III standing." Id.; see, e.g., Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 92 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for retaliation by demonstrating some
nexus between their concrete injury and an alleged violation of Title VII, even though they
were not the intended target of the retaliatory conduct).
129. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
130. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
131. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 128, at *36-38.
132. Id. Thompson relied on Hackett, a case in which the Third Circuit held a "person
claiming to be aggrieved" under Title VII was any individual who satisfied mere Article III
standing. Id. (citing Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). Because the
enforcement provision of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(aX1)(A) (2006), states that
"[ain aggrieved person may commence a civil action," Thompson argued Trafficante equates
prudential standing under both Title VII and Title VIII with mere Article III standing. Id.
at *37-39.
133. Id. at *37-39. Thompson drew upon the similarity of enforcement schemes
originally employed under Title VII and Title VIII. Congress enacted both statutes without
authorizing the administrative agency charged with their enforcement, the EEOC and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development respectively, to initiate
litigation. Id. at *37-38. Under both statutes, enforcement was left up to the Attorney
General in cases alleging a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, and private citizens in
all other contexts. Id. at *37. Thompson argued that this similarity in original
enforcement strategy further illustrates that because Hackett held a Title VII "person
aggrieved" must only satisfy Article III, and the Court in Trafficante found that reasoning
persuasive, the Court in Thompson should also find it persuasive. Id. at *37-39.
134. See id. at *37-39; Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631(2006).
135. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 128, at *36-38.
136.

Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869.
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language, the actual Trafficante holding was not nearly as broad."'7
The qualifying clause-"insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that
is charged with discrimination are concerned"-actually excludes persons
who are within the outer boundaries of Article III standing."' The
Court did acknowledge that subsequent decisions had interpreted the
Title VIII language "aggrieved" to extend standing to the full Article III
limits.'
However, the Court quickly noted that these decisions were
not incompatible with the zone of interests test.o40 Second, the Court
reasoned that if it adopted the reasoning described in Trafficante,
"absurd consequences would follow."141 In addition, Justice Scalia
observed that the Court was not bound by Trafficante because that
decision interpreted Title VIII, not Title VII.142 By declining to apply
rafficante to Title VII, the Court concluded that "the term 'aggrieved'
must be construed more narrowly than the outer boundaries of Article
III.""
After rejecting Thompson's position that a "person aggrieved" under
Title VII included every plaintiff who satisfies Article III, the Court
considered NAS's position that only individuals who engaged in
protected conduct can be "aggrieved" under Title VII.'" Justice Scalia
137. Id. (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209) (noting that the Court in Trafficante held
that the Title VII and Article III definitions of "person aggrieved" were identical, "insofar
as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discriminationare concerned").

138. See id. For example, there may be individuals who suffer concrete, redressable
injuries, as a result of unlawful housing discrimination, who still fail to satisfy prudential
standing requirements; for instance, the proprietor of local grocery that caters to the ethnic
group suffering housing discrimination. This individual suffers an economic injury as a
result of unlawful housing discrimination, but that interest is so far attenuated from those
interests Congress intended Title VIII to protect that, while this individual satisfies Article
III standing, he fails to satisfy the zone of interests test.
139. Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1997)).
140. Id. In Bennett, the Court noted that the enforcement provision of the Endangered
Species Act conferred standing to sue on "any person." 520 U.S. at 166; 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(gX 1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). While this standard is exceptionally broad, especially
when compared to language used in other statutory enforcement provisions, this case
illustrates that occasionally every person who has mere Article III standing will also have
proper standing under the "zone of interests" test.
141. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869 (illustrating the point by offering a hypothetical
corporate shareholder who would have standing to sue a corporation for terminating a
valuable employee for unlawful, racially discriminatory reasons-under Trafficante, the
hypothetical shareholder would have proper standing to sue provided he could prove the
value of his stock decreased as a result of the allegedly unlawful employment action).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 869-70 (noting that "[alt the other extreme from the position that 'person
aggrieved' means anyone with Article III standing, NAS argues that it is a term of art that
refers only to the employee who engaged in the protected activity").
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relied on statutory interpretation"'s and precedent"' to reject this
Ultimately, the Court adopted an
"artificially narrow meaning.""4
intermediate standard that "avoids the extremity of equating [person
aggrieved] with Article III and yet is fully consistent with ... Trafficante."
The Court held that the language "person aggrieved" under Title VII
permits suit by any individual whose interests are "arguably [sought] to
be protected by the statutes."' Justice Scalia reasoned that applying
the zone of interests test was appropriate because it was compatible with
Unfortunately, the Court's hypoprecedent,150 yet not overbroad.'
thetical third-party plaintiffs provided only minimal guidance regarding
what individuals may fall within this zone of interests."' Applying
this standard in Thompson, the Court determined that Thompson's claim
"falls within the zone of interests protected by Title VII" because he "was
an employee of NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees
from their employers' unlawful actions."" The Court reasoned that
Thompson was "well within the zone of interests" protected by Title VII

145. Id. at 870. Justice Scalia noted there was "no basis in text" to support the words
carrying the "artificially narrow meaning." Additionally, he stated, presuming Congress
had intended a more limited interpretation, the text "would more naturally have said
'person claiming to have been discriminated against' rather than 'person claiming to be
aggrieved.'"
146. Id. (reasoning that such a narrow interpretation was actually incompatible with
Trafficante, in which all residents of a certain apartment complex were "person[s]
aggrieved" by unlawful racial discrimination against prospective tenants, despite not
personally suffering any unlawful discrimination).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 495 (1998)).
150. Id. (describing the Court's application of the zone of interests test to the phrase
"person aggrieved" in Thompson as "fully consistent with [the Court's] application of the
term in Trafficante").
151. Id. (emphasizing that while the zone of interests test is deferential, it still excludes
"plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are
unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII;" for example, the hypothetical corporate
shareholder, supra text accompanying note 141).
152. See id. at 868. The majority opinion discussed two hypothetical third-party
retaliation scenarios that illuminate the combinations of third-party relationship and
adverse employment action that may satisfy the Burlington standard. Id. The Court noted
that "firing a close family member will almost always" satisfy Burlington, while "inflicting
a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so." Id. Because the
reasonable reader could reach these conclusions upon reviewing the Court's § 704
precedent, these examples provide only minimal substantive guidance to practitioners
arguing third-party retaliation under Title VII.
153. Id. at 870.
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because he was not an innocent casualty of unlawful discrimination, but
rather, the intended target of unlawful discrimination.14 Given these
circumstances, the Court held that Thompson was "a person aggrieved
with standing to sue" under Title VII."
C.

Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to

offer two "fortifying observation [s]."'

She first observed that the

majority opinion aligned neatly with the EEOC's interpretation of
§ 706(f)( 1).'1 Justice Ginsburg relied upon the EEOC Compliance
Manual"' which prohibits retaliation against a close relative or
associate of an individual who engaged in protected conduct." 9
Therefore, she reasoned that the EEOC's interpretation was entitled to
deference from the Court. 60 Second, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
the interpretation of § 706(f)(1) adopted by the EEOC parallels the
interpretation that other federal agencies have given other labor and
employment statutory provisions regarding standing."'
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The unanimous decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless,
LP'62 illustrated the Supreme Court's continued commitment to protect
employees by broadly interpreting statutes that prohibit workplace

154. Id. ("Thompson is not an accidental victim of the retaliation-collateral damage, so
to speak, of the employer's unlawful act. To the contrary, injuring him was the employer's
intended means of harming Regalado.").
155. Id.
156. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 870-71.
2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8(c) (1998).
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (specifically prohibiting

"retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising
his or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuing
those rights"); 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C).
160. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399-400 (2008) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642
(1998)) (noting that the EEOC's interpretation merits deference because it reflects "a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance").

161.

Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Tasty Baking Co.

v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (noting the National Labor Relations

Board's position that retaliation against a relative violates the National Labor Relations
Act).
162. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
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retaliation.163 The Thompson decision is significant because it injects
another variable into the BurlingtonNorthern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Whitel64 adverse employment action analysis in third-party retaliation cases.
In traditional cases like Burlington Northern, where retaliation is
directed at the plaintiff-protester, a sufficiently adverse employment
action is one that "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.""' In Burlington
Northern, the Court relied on the plaintiff's gender and family responsibilities to determine that the employment action at issue was sufficiently
adverse.' 66 These considerations illustrate that the Burlington Northern majority intended its "reasonable worker" to share some personal
Unfortunately however, this
characteristics with the plaintiff.'
standard provided little guidance as to what other personal characteristics of the plaintiff trial courts should attribute to the similarly-situated,
reasonable employee.
Given the BurlingtonNorthernmajority's scant guidance on this point,
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to argue that
courts must naturally consider at least one other factor: the severity of
the original discriminatory act.16 Justice Alito reasoned that plaintiffs
who suffer extreme underlying discrimination will not readily be
deterred from exercising their Title VII'69 rights.170

Conversely,

163. Since Justice Roberts's confirmation in September, 2005, the Court has
consistently interpreted retaliation provisions broadly, affording significant protection to
individuals seeking redress for retaliation. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 273 (2009) (extending Title VII protection from
retaliation to employees who oppose another employee's discrimination during an
employer's investigation of the other employee's complaint); CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (recognizing that § 1981 prohibits workplace
retaliation); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (acknowledging that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act provides a cause of action for retaliation to federal
employees); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,57 (2006) (holding that
the application of the Title VII retaliation provision is not limited to employer's
employment-related or workplace actions).
164. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
165. Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (2006)).
166. Id. at 57, 72-73 (emphasizing the following two facts to conclude that White's
suspension without pay was a sufficiently adverse employment action: (1) that Sheila
White was "the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way department at
Burlington's Tennessee Yard," and (2) that because of the suspension, "White and her
family had to live for 37 days without income").
167. Id. at 78-79 (Alito, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 77-78.
169. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
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individuals who suffer less severe discrimination might be more easily
dissuaded from exercising their Title VII rights."' Justice Alito
concluded that juries must consider the nature and severity of the
underlying discrimination to determine whether an employer's allegedly
retaliatory employment action was sufficiently adverse to dissuade a
similarly-situated, reasonable employee from engaging in protected
conduct.7 2
In the context of third-party retaliation cases, the Court's decision in
Thompson injects another necessary factor into the Burlington Northern
adverse employment action analysis: the identity of the intended target
of the allegedly retaliatory conduct. In traditional retaliation cases, the
plaintiff engaged in some protected conduct and suffered the adverse
employment action. However, in third-party retaliation cases, one
person, the protestor, engaged in some protected conduct, while a
different person, the target, suffered the adverse employment action.
This distinction requires courts to consider the intended target of an
adverse employment action when assessing Burlington Northern
adversity in third-party retaliation claims.
The Court's decision in Thompson effectively reduces the adverse
employment action element of third-party retaliation claims to a twopart test: is the vector-sum combination of an adverse employment
action and that action's intended third-party target sufficiently adverse
to dissuade a reasonable, similarly-situated employee from exercising his
statutory rights? Courts should include the intended target of thirdparty retaliation in the BurlingtonNorthern adverse employment action
analysis because the adversity of a particular retaliatory act could vary
considerably depending on who will suffer that retaliatory act."' This
may result in courts applying a sliding scale to the severity of the
adverse employment action and the proximity of relationship between

170. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 78 (noting that the "reasonable employee who
is subjected to the most severe discrimination will not easily be dissuaded from filing a
charge by the threat of retaliation").
171. Id. (reasoning that for an employee who suffers mild discrimination "the costs of
complaining, including possible retaliation, will not have to be great to outweigh the lesser
benefits that might be obtained by filing a charge").
172. Id. at 78 n.2 ("Without gauging the severity of the initial alleged discrimination,
a jury cannot possibly compare the costs and benefits of filing a charge and, thus, cannot
possibly decide whether the employer's alleged retaliatory conduct is severe enough to
dissuade the filing of a charge.").
173. The reasoning that supports considering the target of the retaliatory action in the
adverse employment action analysis is identical to the logic Justice Alito employed in his
Burlington Northern concurrence-that an individual's willingness to pursue statutorilyprotected conduct may fluctuate depending upon who will suffer an act of retaliation. See
id. at 78.
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the protester and the plaintiff. For example, an extreme adverse
employment action-termination-imposed upon a third-party more
remote than a fianc(-a significant other-might well establish a third
party's protection under Thompson. 7 1 Similarly, a milder adverse
employment action-suspension without pay-imposed upon a third-party
more closely related than a fianc6-for example, a spouse-might also
warrant Title VII protection for the third-party under Thompson. 171
However, retaliation involving more mild reprisals-for example, a letter
of reprimand or placing an employee on a performance improvement
plan-directed at more attenuated targets-for example, a random coworker-will probably not warrant Title VII protection.
Unfortunately for practitioners litigating third-party claims, the Court
understandably refrained from articulating any specific combinations of
adverse employment actions and third-party relationships that satisfy
or fall short of Burlington Northern adversity."' While the Thompson
opinion's language provides some guidance, it stops predictably short of
articulating any fixed point of reference for practitioners and courts to
evaluate third-party retaliation, thus requiring further litigation to flesh
out the skeleton of third-party retaliation claims under Title VII.
Since Thompson, several district courts have analyzed third-party
retaliation claims.1 77 These decisions illustrate expansive interpretations of Burlington Northern and a willingness to apply Thompson to
factual scenarios beyond those presented before the Supreme Court. In
EEOC v. Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc, 7 s the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon recognized a third-party retaliation
claim by an individual who was terminated after his sister filed a sexual
harassment charge with the EEOC."' The district court interpreted
Thompson to permit third-party retaliation claims when a plaintiffs

174. See, e.g., Harrington v. Career Training Inst. Orlando, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-1817-T33MAP, 2011 WL 4389870 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011).
175. See, e.g., Willis v. Cleco Corp., No. 09-2103, 2011 WL 4443312 at *10 (W.D. La.
Sept. 22, 2011).
176. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868. At one extreme, the Court noted that terminating
"a close family member will almost always" satisfy Burlington Northern, while alternatively, the Court opined that subjecting "a mere acquaintance" to a less severe adverse
employment action "will almost never do so." Id.
177. See, e.g., Willis, 2011 WL 4443312; Harrington,2011 WL 4389870; Zamora v. City
of Houston, No. 4:07-4510, 2011 WL 4067860 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2011); EEOC v.
Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., No. CV 09-690-PK, 2011 WL 886402 (D. Ore. Mar. 14,
2011).
178. No. CV 09-690-PK, 2011 WL 886402 (D. Ore. Mar. 14, 2011).
179. Id. at *12.
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family member engaged in statutorily-protected conduct.18 o Similarly,
in Harrington v. CareerTRaining Institute Orlando, Inc.,'"' the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found that
Thompson applied where individuals were only dating, as opposed to
engaged to be married.8 8 The court reasoned that the combination of
a dating relationship and a termination was sufficient to warrant thirdparty protection because the Supreme Court did not specifically bar such
a claim.8'x
Furthermore, courts have countenanced third-party retaliation claims
where individuals suffered much less severe adverse employment
actions. In Willis v. Cleco Corp.," the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana recognized a third-party retaliation
claim where the employer suspended the plaintiff five days without pay,
allegedly in response to her husband filing a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC.'15 Also, in Zamora v. City of Houston," the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas approved
a third-party claim where the defendant reassigned the plaintiff from a
prestigious special unit to a regular patrol unit in response to his father
filing an age discrimination charge with the EEOC.'8 '
Despite innumerable scenarios in which third-party retaliation may
occur, Thompson does provide some practical guidelines for litigating
third-party retaliation claims. Practitioners representing employers
should construct arguments confining the holding of Thompson to the
termination of an individual within the first degree of relationship to the
protester."' This application appears to be the most narrow, reasonable construction of the Court's language. Conversely, the only

180. Id. at *9 (noting that a plaintiff satisfies Thompson when he or she "is in a family
relationship with another employee who engaged in protected activity").
181. No. 8:11-cs-1817-T-33MAP, 2011 WL 4389870 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21,2011) (applying
Thompson to suit under § 1981).
182. Id. at *2 (noting that "the Court's ruling in Thompson does not exclude third party
reprisal claims for individuals who are merely dating").
183. Id.
184. No. 09-2103, 2011 WL 4443312 (W.D. La. Sept. 22, 2011).
185. Id. at *3, *10.
186. No. 4:07-4510, 2011 WL 4067860 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2011).
187. Id. at *1, *5 (recounting the plaintiffs allegations that "in early 2008, he was
forced by his [Houston Police Department] superiors to transfer out of the prestigious
Crime Reduction Unit ("CRU") and to accept a less desirable position as a "patrol officer"
because his father, also a Houston Police Department employee, filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC in December 2007).
188. The first degree of relationship would include the protester's fiancd or spouse,
parents, children, and siblings. For example, those within the "family relationship"
mentioned in Willamette Tree. See 2011 WL 886402 at *9.
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combination of retaliatory act and third-party relationship identified by
the Court as insufficient is "inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere
acquaintance."" 9 Because this language does not explicitly prohibit
cognizable third-party retaliation claims on behalf of more distantlyrelated, or unrelated, individuals, practitioners representing both
employees and the EEOC should urge courts to recognize third-party
retaliation claims for a variety of third parties' associated with
protesting employees or former employees who have suffered a variety
of less severe retaliatory adverse employment actions.' Urging courts
to apply Thompson to more distantly-related, or unrelated, third parties
who suffer retaliatory actions less severe than termination embodies the
Court's broad adverse employment action standard articulated in
Burlington Northern.
Only time, and future decisions, will identify where the nuanced
boundaries of third-party retaliation liability lie. As courts continue to
interpret and apply Thompson, these decisions will clarify exactly what
combinations of adverse employment actions and third-party relationships Title VII protects. Until then, practitioners litigating third-party
retaliation claims would be wise to exploit the malleable language in the
Court's opinion in Thompson to achieve desired outcomes for their
clients.
DODSON D. STRAWBRIDGE

189. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
190. Aside from those individuals in the first degree of relationship to the protester,
plaintiffs' counsel would be wise to advocate applying Thompson to any third party that
is related to the protester by either blood or marriage. Further, under proper circumstances, Thompson would also protect individuals unrelated to the protester, such as friends and
co-workers. Appropriate facts and skilled advocacy could entice courts to afford Title VII
protection to a plethora of third parties, provided the third-party relationship is close
enough that the adverse employment action would be sufficiently adverse under Burlington
Northern.

191. For example, common less extreme adverse actions than termination include
demotion, suspension, reassignment, denial of training or support, and modification of work
schedules.

